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Foucault visited Brazil five times between 1965 and 1976 under conditions of a repressive military dictatorship that began in March 1964 with the overthrow of the left-leaning government of João Goulart and lasted until March 1985. *Foucault in Brazil* circles around a series of questions about Foucault's relation to this authoritarian regime. How did Foucault respond to the dictatorship? How did the dictatorship respond to him? What does Foucault's engagement with this deeply antidemocratic regime of the late 1960s and 70s have to teach us about the current rise of autocratic rule, including the more recent authoritarian presidency of Bolsonaro in Brazil? We might extend these questions to names like Putin, Erdogan, Orban, Modi, Trump.

In this essay I focus on the politics of silence, one of the major concerns of Hoffman's book. Foucault delivered lectures in Brazil at the height of a brutal dictatorship. And yet, he did not speak directly about the dictatorship until his penultimate visit to Brazil in the fall of 1975. Why, Hoffman asks, was Foucault silent for so long? And why was the silence broken? How are we to read that silence? Among the many stunning contributions of Hoffman's book are the thoroughly researched, archivally based, politically situated details it brings to these difficult questions.

Drawing on *Foucault in Brazil*, I ask about silence within the broader frame of Foucault's published work from the Brazil years. This period reverberates with a range of Foucault's writings, some canonical, some more obscure. The ones I have in mind include a 1968 interview in the French magazine, *Esprit*, called "Réponse à une question," about Tunisia; his 1973 Rio de Janeiro lectures, "Truth and Juridical Forms;" *Discipline and Punish*, 1975; his 1974-75 course, *Abnormals*; and the first volume of *History of Sexuality*, 1976, the last year Foucault visited Brazil. Also included in my broader frame are critiques of Foucault's work by decolonial, feminist, and critical race and black

studies scholars. Those critiques frame how I want to navigate *Foucault in Brazil* as an inquiry into the politics of speech and silence.

In her canonical 1988 essay, “Can the Subaltern Speak,” Gayatri Chakrabarty Spivak describes Foucault’s speech about the colonial Other as “a site of betrayal.”¹ According to Spivak, Foucault, with Deleuze, is guilty of a typical left-intellectual “ventriloquism of the speaking subaltern” (Spivak 27) played out in his analyses of European, mostly French, clinics, asylums, prisons, and universities, what Spivak calls “screen-allegories” of an imperialism he cannot name or grasp. In a 1998 essay, “Racialized Punishment and Prison Abolition,” Angela Davis complains that *Discipline and Punish* has nothing to say about race, gender, or the historical connections between slavery and carceral power.² In 2014, in *Habeas Viscus*, Alexander Weheliye draws on Sylvia Wynter and Hortense Spillers to mount his complaints about Foucault’s “truancy” with regard to racism and racialization.³ Weheliye follows Brady Heiner in accusing Foucault of stealing from George Jackson, Angela Davis, and the Black Panther Party when he wrote his 1975 book, *Discipline and Punish*.⁴ More recently, in her 2022 book, *Plasticity*, Catherine Malabou devotes a chapter to Foucault’s “Thought of the Outside,” where she contrasts Foucault’s Blanchotian “literary” “outside” with Latin American philosophy, what she calls an “outside of the outside” Foucault cannot account for or comprehend.⁵

Despite their differences, these disappointments in Foucault’s politics reduce his thought to a moral binarism between, on the one hand, a courageous speech on behalf of the oppressed and, on the other, silence as complicity with oppression. That complicity is viewed as evidence of an obtuse inability to see—an Oedipal blindness that is the result of privilege. In Davis, Weheliye, or Malabou, it manifests as a Foucauldian discourse that has nothing to say at all about X (where X is slavery, colonialism, the outside of the outside). In a more surreptitious mode, in Spivak and Heiner, complicity manifests as a discourse that tricks us by ventriloquizing or stealing the other’s speech. But in the end, the result is the same: Foucault has nothing helpful or liberating to say about X. Foucault’s silence reveals a truth about his work. Because it has nothing to say about X, it is morally suspect and politically inadequate for addressing the roots of oppression.

Foucault in Brazil does not discuss these critiques directly. But we can read Hoffman’s book as a way to excavate some deeper questions about the problem of silence as complicity with oppression. In fact, *Foucault in Brazil* begins by questioning what Hoffman calls “the equation” of silence with complicity with intolerable acts.⁶ To complicate the silence = complicity equation is not to pardon Foucault for his sins of omission, but rather to think more deeply about what Foucault describes in the 1968 *Esprit* interview as “the relationship between what I say and a certain political practice.”⁷ To ask about the relationship between “what I say” and “a certain political practice”

is also to ask about the conditions for the possibility of silence and the many forms it can take.

By the time of his second visit to Brazil in 1973, Foucault was famous not only as a philosopher but also as a political militant. His 1966 book, *The Order of Things*, was seen by many as an impetus for the uprisings in France known as May '68. Between 1966 and 1968 Foucault taught at the University of Tunis and actively supported his students there in their protest movement against the authoritarian Tunisian government. Between 1971 and 1972, Foucault founded and participated in an anti-prison group, the GIP. Foucault's scathing critiques of the blackmail of the Enlightenment, along with his political activities, made him a symbol of left intellectualism by the time he returned to Brazil in 1973.

In that year, in Rio de Janeiro, Foucault was lecturing to a community of academics that had been tormented by political persecution through military police inquiries, the IPMs. The IPM, or *inquérito policial militar*, was the mechanism for the interrogation and sometimes torture of the regime's opponents. But it was not until two visits later, in 1975 in São Paulo during his fourth visit to Brazil, that Foucault finally spoke directly and publicly about the dictatorship. In 1975, he responded openly to news about the torture of a history student, Sarita Mello, and expressed his solidarity with the protesters who gathered in response to this and other instances of arrest, persecution, surveillance, and torture. Forty-eight of those protesting students and professors were subsequently arrested. During the same period in October 1975 the journalist Vladimir Herzog died after being tortured. A massive protest at the cathedral of São Paulo brought public awareness to this atrocity. The intensity of these events in the fall of 1975 led Foucault to cancel his planned course on sexuality at the University of São Paulo and direct his energies toward protest. He made a public declaration that would soon be published as a manifesto. "You can't teach under boot heels," he said,

you can't speak in the face of the walls of prisons; you can't study when arms threaten. The struggles of intellectual workers unite with those of manual workers. The University of São Paulo knows that your struggle today is connected to the struggle for freedom in all of the countries of the world. I pay tribute to your courage and I willingly associate myself with the decisions you make to ensure that justice here is not an outrageous word (cited in Hoffman 76).

I start here with this *parrhesiastic* scene—a scene of fearless speech, of silence broken—both to emphasize the fact that Foucault *did* speak out, here and on numerous other occasions, but also to ask about the multitude of occasions—in Brazil, in Tunisia, and elsewhere—when he chose to remain silent. I ask about this in order to question our habit of reducing speech and silence to a moral dualism between good and bad politics, where speech is heroic and

courageous while silence is timid and complicit with intolerable acts. As Foucault puts it in a famous passage from *History of Sexuality Volume One*:

Silence itself – the things one declines to say, or is forbidden to name, the discretion that is required between different speakers—is less the absolute limit of discourse, the other side from which it is separated by a strict boundary, than an element that functions alongside the things said, with them and in relation to them within overall strategies. There is no binary division to be made between what one says and what one does not say; we must determine the different ways of not saying such things, how those who can and those who cannot speak of them are distributed, which type of discourse is authorized, or which form of discretion is required in either case. There is not one but many silences....⁸

So I agree with Hoffman who asserts that “silence is not reducible to *complicity* in the world of political practices” (Hoffman 14). We might say, then, that silence and speech as political acts are not reducible to ahistorical principles for action. If genealogy teaches us anything it is certainly this: silence and speech must be navigated, evaluated, and practiced within contingent, conditioned, relational networks of power. There is a complex ethics of speech and silence at work here whose conditions of possibility include what Daniele Lorenzini calls a history of truth as “a history of truth-telling” whose force—the force of truth—he aligns with “the possibilizing dimension of [Foucault’s] genealogical method.”⁹ We hear echoes of this in the words of the Brazilian psychoanalyst Jurandir Freire Costa, whom Hoffman cites. Foucault “was never an irresponsible provocateur. He knew that he was under a dictatorship, surrounded by persons who were vulnerable. There was a tacit agreement that *we would only speak of what was possible*” (in Hoffman 51, emphasis added). I’m interested in this “what was possible” and how it relates to Lorenzini’s possibilization. More on that in a moment.

As Hoffman puts it, Foucault’s silence was “carefully crafted” (Hoffman 69) as a kind of safeguard, “a form of the care of the self and others” (Hoffman 14). “Many living under Brazilian dictatorship,” Hoffman writes, “had no choice but to remain silent in their militancy. Maintaining silence in public was a means of protecting oneself and others in a dictatorship bent on detecting, monitoring, and punishing the slightest signs of subversion. Public silence was also a manner of engaging in solidarity with silenced others” (Hoffman 14). Indeed, in 1970s Brazil “silence” was even able to “gestate collective forms of militancy by safe guarding oneself and others for more propitious moments of action” (Hoffman 73). Perhaps São Paulo in October 1975, when Foucault did speak, was one of those more propitious moments.

This empirical reality is interwoven with Foucault’s understanding of technologies of power-knowledge invested in discursive games of truth. Such investments include a range of intensities, from sexuality as an incitement to speech, to various mundane or bureaucratic forms of forced speech, to speech

extracted through torture. Drawing on the 1973 lectures, “Truth and Juridical Forms,” Hoffman helpfully frames that extraction of speech through inquiry, or *enquête*, as one of those forms. In *Foucault in Brazil*, *enquête* as a scientific technology for gathering data for the production of truth intersects with the historically specific practice of the Brazilian IPMs. That crossing of a historically variable, resurgent *enquête* with its specific instantiation as the dreaded police *inquérito* in the 1970s allows us to situate these particular forms of speech, silence, inquiry, and truth as bound up with the logic of biopolitics.

As Hoffman explains, Brazilian doctors, psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts participated in torture sessions to extend torture to the furthest bearable limits of its victims. Extending torture means extending life through what Foucault describes in *History of Sexuality Volume One* as “the nearly infinite task of telling” (Foucault *Volume 1*, 20). As Foucault puts it, biopower works through “an intensification of the body” via “techniques for maximizing life” (Foucault *Volume 1*, 123). This bourgeois “art of longevity” (Foucault 125)—“ways of having healthy children and keeping them alive as long as possible” (Foucault *Volume 1*, 125) to serve what Foucault calls a “racism of expansion” (Foucault *Volume 1*, 125)—is perversely inverted in the Brazilian regime’s deployment of this bourgeois art of longevity against Brazilian members of the middle and upper classes in medicalized practices of torture. The inversion is not only spatial (from France to Brazil) but also temporal: an old technology (torture) criss-crosses with a new one (modern therapeutic medicine) to transform the opposition between life and death in its relation to power. “Death is power’s limit,” Foucault writes (Foucault *Volume 1*, 138). *Foucault in Brazil* allows us to read Herzog’s death under torture less through the sovereign lens of an ancient right to take life or let live—*de faire mourir ou de laisser vivre*—than the lens of a power that fosters life or disallows it to the point of death—*de faire vivre ou de rejeter dans la mort*.¹⁰ Here the famous chiasmus is also a description of a horrifying reality in 1970s Brazil, where life is fostered through technologies of torture that quite literally extend it. Death, power’s limit, is “disqualified,” converted into a form of “nearly infinite” speech, a nearly infinite speech that masks death with a discursive proliferation of speech and silence, things said and things not said. That discursive proliferation begins with technologies of the *enquête*.

Such an analysis of an almost limitless speech-with-many-silences that begins with extraction through torture brings to the fore a particular kind of silence as a form of resistance—the collective silence of solidarity with the persecuted. This silence speaks not only as solidarity with the tortured caught in a cruel game of speaking and not speaking (where to speak is to admit defeat), but also reframes silence as a powerful collective counter-practice to the torturer’s violence. A concrete manifestation of this collective counter-conduct—an inversion of the extractive, individualizing technology of the *enquête*—occurred at the October 1975 interfaith memorial service for the journalist Herzog who was killed through torture. Eight thousand people

arrived in silence at the cathedral. “All of us are conversing in silence,” the Archbishop said.¹¹

This reinforces the notion we see articulated so clearly in *History of Sexuality Volume One*, that there is not one but many silences, and that silence is less the absolute limit of discourse than something that functions alongside things said. Recall Freire Costa’s comment about the tacit agreement in the midst of dictatorship to only speak what was possible: possibilization as a politics of truth. What is possible here specifically? Indeed what does possible mean? In a 1974 letter to his partner, Daniel Defert, Foucault gives us an answer: coded speech. Hoffman cites the letter, written from Brazil, where Foucault says: “You have to maintain a coded historical discourse, the only possible one” (in Hoffman 51). What is this historical coding and what does it mean to say “it’s the only possible one”? What does possible mean here and how does it interface with the “possibilizing” politics of truth?

Let me return to “Truth and Juridical Forms,” delivered in Rio de Janeiro in five lectures in 1973. Hoffman investigates those lectures, retracing Foucault’s delineation of the different technologies for the production of power-knowledge—the juridical forms of the title—through the test, the inquiry, and the examination. Focusing on the inquiry, Hoffman points out that Foucault’s original French term, *enquête*, was translated into Portuguese by Jardim and Machado as *inquérito* (rather than *investigação*), thereby bringing attention to the word that defines the primary mechanism of repression of the dictatorship, the IPMs—*inquérito policial militar*. This is a clear example of a historical coding, initiated by Foucault with the word *enquête*, then taken up and intensified by his Brazilian interlocutors in their choice to translate *enquête* as *inquérito*.

But what is meant by a “coded historical discourse” here, and why is it the only possible one? A code is a system of symbols that conveys a surface meaning to be deciphered for the secret meaning hidden beneath it. But this usual conception of code repeats the logic of concealment and revelation, repression and liberation—the logic of the secret of sex—that Foucault was critiquing at this precise moment in writing *History of Sexuality Volume One*. There is not one but many silences.... The idea of code suggests we read Foucault’s text like a detective novel whose ending will reveal the secret beneath the code. But in doing so we must bypass the temptation to reduce discourse—the code—and silence—the secret—to a binary structure built on the logic of repression.

The logic that drives Foucault’s “coded historical discourse, the only one” is not repressive but proliferative. In a situation of intense constraint—a dictatorship like the one in Brazil—only one discourse is possible: a coded one. But the coding works to proliferate a counter-discourse beyond the constraints of its original context. We might call this the counter-proliferation of Foucault’s coded historical discourse. (An important aside: the

proliferation of historical singularities is not the same as conceptual generalization.) Foucault's texts describe singularities—histories, *histoires*, collaged together from archival scraps that bear the claw marks of a power that possibilizes across a scale where historical contingencies matter. In Brazil, only one discourse was possible: a coded one whose “double speak” proliferates its possible scenes like the psycho-ethical doubles he describes in his 1975 lectures, *Abnormal*. That discursive doubling is triggered by images, figures, turns of phrase: little rhetorical bombs strewn throughout the text. The things said speak not only to the scene in question—*Oedipus the King*, *Oidipous turannos*—but also invent, crack open new spaces where we might hear the murmur of the things not said that accompany the things that are said. In *Foucault in Brazil*, we can hear this murmur as “the element that functions alongside the things said, with them and in relation to them within overall strategies” (Foucault *Volume 1*, 27). In this sense, *Foucault in Brazil* teaches us how to read Foucault's code as tactical interventions in a field where speech and silences are distributed.

A clear example of this is the 1973 lecture, “Truth and Juridical Forms,” where Foucault speaks at length about Sophocles's *Oedipus the King*. Hoffman mentions the relation between Oedipus and the *enquête* that Foucault goes to great lengths to describe, especially the moment where Oedipus learns about his parentage by threatening a slave from Cithaeron with torture. *Oedipus the King* is *Oidipous turannos*. “His only problem is power—can he stay in power?”¹² He's the “chief officer of the law” (Foucault “Truth,” 26) and yet he is also “the one who attaches no importance to the laws and who replaces them with his whims and his orders” (“Truth,” 28). Just or not, the tyrant “will have to be obeyed all the same” (“Truth,” 28). The tyrant's “wish will be the law of the city” (“Truth,” 28). And, Foucault points out, the sovereign Oedipus is not only a tyrant of power, he is also a tyrant of knowledge. *Oidipous*, from the verb *oida*, which means “to know” and “to see” (“Truth,” 29). *Oidipous turannos* embodies “the autocratic knowledge of the tyrant” (“Truth,” 29).

And so we might conclude, on reading these passages, that the code is clear. *Oidipous turannos* is also the modern-day tyrant of power-knowledge. He is the Brazilian dictator of the 1970s. He is Bolsonaro; he is Donald Trump who dreams of a return to absolute sovereign power. But this is, as Foucault tells Defert, a “coded historical discourse, the only possible one” (in Hoffman 51). The code here is contingent, constrained by dictatorship. Which is why, in “Truth and Juridical Forms,” there is an inversion of knowledge. Foucault tells his audience in Rio de Janeiro: “What had to disappear from this society was the union of power and knowledge. From this time onward, the man of power would be the man of ignorance. In the end, what befell Oedipus was that, knowing too much, he didn't know anything. The blind ruler who didn't know, and who didn't know because he could do too much” (Foucault “Truth,” 32).

The coded historical discourse tells us something important we need to hear today. Dictatorship in the 1970s is something other than a simple return to sovereign power. In *Abnormal*, a course from the same period, Foucault calls it “vile sovereignty”: *souveraineté infâme*.¹³ The tyrant of knowledge becomes a buffoon: “the weaker the system is epistemologically, the better it functions.” (Foucault, *Abnormal* 33). This inversion of the relation between power and knowledge is modern and inventive—alarmingly so. Dictatorship proliferates discourses Foucault calls Ubu-esque – ridiculous, risible, dangerous discourses. *Oedipus the King* becomes *Ubu roi*, where Ubu is Hitler, Mussolini, Bolsonaro, Modi, Trump, the joke that kills. Foucault’s coded historical discourse proliferates these figures as biopolitical.

From a “coded historical discourse” as “the only possible one” we find, instead, a proliferation of possibilities. Is this the optimistic parrhesiastic possibilization of truth we find in Lorenzini? Perhaps. Foucault’s code here works through inversion and proliferation in a system of gradation whose regulatory, self-correcting functions are much harder to counter than the yes-no dualisms of speech and silence.

Let me end with this unanswered question about possibility and its meanings in the context of the present. At the beginning of the second lecture of “Truth and Juridical Forms,” Foucault introduces his reading of *Oedipus the King* with a reference to Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus*, published the year before, in 1972. Here, from the start of the lecture, the inversion has taken place: *Oedipus the King* begins as *Anti-Oedipus*. That inversion of the Oedipal *enquête* as a “political form” (Foucault “Truth,” 52) is already a site of invention: it generates ever-proliferating new versions of itself, including libidinally driven, psychological ones. How are we to read these inventions? A year after his last visit to Brazil, Foucault writes a preface to the American edition of *Anti-Oedipus*, which he calls in an “Introduction to a Nonfascist Life” the “Last but not least, the major enemy, the strategic adversary is fascism. . . . And not only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini—which was able to mobilize and use the desire of the masses so effectively—the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us.”¹⁴

Foucault famously calls *Anti-Oedipus* “a book of ethics” (Foucault, *Anti-Oedipus* 108). “How does one keep from being fascist, even (especially when) we believe ourselves to be a revolutionary militant? How do we rid our speech and our acts, our hearts and our pleasures, of fascism? How do we ferret out the fascism that is ingrained in our behavior” (Foucault, *Anti-Oedipus* 108)? *Foucault in Brazil* intensifies these questions, questions for our age. How are we to live in a fascisizing present? In concluding with these questions, I follow Alberto Toscano whose recent book, *Late Fascism* (2023), warns us against ahistorical comparisons: oh look, Bolsonaro, Modi, Trump—they’re just like Hitler and Mussolini.¹⁵ Looking around my own campus

invaded by armed police in April 2023 and again, more brutally, in April 2024, I immediately thought “is this fascism?” Following Toscano, I’m learning to modulate this question, one that is driven by fear and horror. Instead of “is this fascism?” I’m beginning to ask: what is this play of fascisizing forces? How can we counter them? What discourse is possible? In each moment, what tactics of speech and silence are possible within a strategic field? And if, as Foucault writes, thought is a form of action, how can thought counter these fascisizing technologies of power-knowledge-pleasure that include the constitution of our desires and affects, the fascism in our heads? These questions emerged like a hologram as I read and reread Hoffman’s groundbreaking book. In *Foucault in Brazil*, we encounter Foucault in the midst of a play of historically singular fascisizing forces. The distribution of speech and silence Hoffman describes includes the archives that generated a book called *Foucault in Brazil*. That Brazil archive also includes the extra-Brazilian, pre-1970s archives of madness and *lettres de cachets* where Foucault, again, practices tactical maneuvers within a field of potentially fascisizing forces. We might read *Foucault in Brazil*, like Foucault’s genealogies, as a coded historical discourse where, as Foucault puts it, “real lives are played [jouées].”¹⁶ “Not a history of the past in terms of the present,” but a “history of the present” that leaves us asking: What is possible today?¹⁷

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- ¹ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in *Can the Subaltern Speak? Reflections on the History of an Idea*, ed. Rosalind C. Morris (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 23. Hereafter cited in the text as Spivak.
- ² Angela Davis, "Racialized Punishment and Prison Abolition," in *The Angela Y. Davis Reader*, ed. Joy James (New York: Blackwell, 1998), 96-110.
- ³ Alexander G. Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 56.
- ⁴ Brady Heiner, "Foucault and the Black Panthers," *City 11*, #3 (2007): 313-356. For a more nuanced view that seriously engages Foucault and Black thought, see Taryn D. Jordan and Haylee Christine Harrell, "black Foucault: An Intellectual Reparations Project," *Foucault Studies 37* (2005): 5-34, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13604810701668969>.
- ⁵ Catherine Malabou, "Philosophy and the Outside: Foucault and Decolonial Thinking," in *Plasticity: The Promise of an Explosion* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2022), 179-186.
- ⁶ Marcello Hoffman, *Foucault in Brazil: Dictatorship, Resistance, and Solidarity* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2024), 14. Hereafter cited in the text as Hoffman.
- ⁷ Michel Foucault, "Politics and the Study of Discourse," trans. Colin Gordon, in *The Foucault Effect*, ed. Colin Gordon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 61.
- ⁸ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Random House, 1985), 27. Hereafter cited in the text as Foucault Volume 1.
- ⁹ Daniele Lorenzini, *The Force of Truth: Critique, Genealogy, and Truth-Telling in Michel Foucault* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2023), 9.
- ¹⁰ Michel Foucault, *Histoire de la sexualité, vol. 1: La Volonté de savoir* (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), 108.
- ¹¹ The progressive archbishop of Recife and Olinda, Hélder Pessoa Câmara, was asked about not speaking during the service. "Why speak in a high voice," he asked, "when all of us are conversing in silence?" (in Hoffman 94-95).
- ¹² Michel Foucault, "Truth and Juridical Forms," in *Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol. 3: Power*, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 1994), 25. Hereafter cited in the text as Foucault "Truth."
- ¹³ Michel Foucault, *Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-1975*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2003), 12. Hereafter cited in the text as Foucault, *Abnormal*. For French original see Michel Foucault, *Les Anormaux: Cours au Collège de France, 1974-1975* (Paris: Seuil/Gallimard, 1999), 12.
- ¹⁴ Michel Foucault, "Preface to *Anti-Oedipus*," in *Essential Works of Foucault, Vol. 3*, 108. Hereafter cited in the text as Foucault, *Anti-Oedipus*.
- ¹⁵ Alberto Toscano, *Late Fascism: Race, Capitalism, and the Politics of Crisis* (London: Verso, 2023).
- ¹⁶ Michel Foucault, "Lives of Infamous Men," in *Essential Works of Foucault, Vol. 3*: 160.
- ¹⁷ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Random House, 1977), 31.